HFS Committee Hears Criticism of SEC Policy on ESG Proxies

Steven Lofchie Commentary by Steven Lofchie

The House Financial Services Committee considered testimony from witnesses advocating against the inclusion of ESG proposals or non-material economic matters in the shareholder-proposal process.

At a hearing entitled "Protecting Investor Interests: Examining Environmental and Social Policy in Financial Regulation," the following witnesses testified:

  • Manhattan Institute Senior Fellow & Director James Copland. Mr. Copeland criticized changes to the shareholder-proposal process in the past decade for (i) "stray[ing] far" from its "principal legal purpose" to ensure adequate, non-deceptive shareholder proposals, (ii) being utilized almost exclusively by a small number of investors that are focused on issues other than maximizing share value and (iii) allowing such investors to "influence corporate behavior to the detriment of the average diversified shareholder." Mr. Copeland also attributed the "explosive recent growth" in shareholder proposals to SEC Legal Bulletin No. 14L, stating that the bulletin had undercut longstanding guidance that shareholder proposals must be material to a company's business. Mr. Copeland noted that this change has forced issuers to include on their proxy ballots "any shareholder proposal related to issues of ‘social policy significance,’" even if they are economically immaterial.
  • American Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow Benjamin Zycher. Mr. Zycher also condemned changes to the shareholder-proposal process, calling the politicization of corporate management decisions a "perverse trend." He advised Congress to pursue legislation that will prevent proxy advisors from making politically motivated choices and to make clear that "only under new legislation can regulatory efforts to force reductions in [greenhouse gas] emissions be justified."
  • Mayer Brown Special Counsel Lawrence Cunningham. Mr. Cunningham argued the need for revisions to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 ("Shareholder proposals") by pointing to companies’ willingness to negotiate settlements to get proposals that are "unfocused on shareholder value," off of the ballot. He recommended changes that would (i) heighten eligibility requirements for shareholders and (ii) tighten rules regarding submission of "repeat, duplicative or moot proposals."
  • Society for Corporate Governance Vice President Ted Allen. Mr. Allen agreed with the other witnesses that investors should not be forced to vote on matters that are "not significantly related to the business of the issuer" and emphasized that many ESG-related proposals could raise "contentious policy issues" that may be better addressed through traditional governmental means, such as through Congress or state legislatures.

In addition, the following legislative proposals were examined:

Commentary

It seems obvious when an interest group takes a small position in an issuer in order to force a proxy vote, and then sells the shares thereafter - if they are able to reach a compromise on the proxy position - the group was not acting to improve the company for the benefit of shareholders but rather to advance their personal interests. One may agree or not with the group's policy goals, but the SEC ought not to be instituting policies that favor such interest groups at the expenses of shareholders. See SEC Diminishes Roadblocks to Proxy Proposals on Social Policy and related comments.

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