Banking Agencies Propose Rule to Ease Capital Requirements

Sebastian Souchet Commentary by Sebastian Souchet

The Federal Reserve Board ("Fed"), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") requested comment on a proposed rule "to modify the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio ["eSLR"] standards applicable to ... global systemically important bank holding companies ("GSIBs") and their depository institution subsidiaries."

The agencies jointly proposed to: (i) recalibrate the eSLR buffer for GSIBs to 50 percent of the firm's method 1 GSIB surcharge, replacing the current fixed 2 percent buffer; (ii) apply the same 50 percent calibration to the eSLR standard for depository institution subsidiaries of GSIBs, replacing the current 6 percent "well capitalized" threshold under the prompt corrective action framework; (iii) revise the OCC's methodology for identifying which national banks and federal savings associations are subject to the eSLR standard to ensure it applies only to those that are GSIB subsidiaries, consistent with the agencies' "regulatory tailoring framework;" (iv) make conforming changes to the leverage-based components of the Board's total loss-absorbing capacity and long-term debt requirements, which currently rely on the fixed 2 percent buffer; and (v) make certain "technical corrections to the capital rule."

Fed Chair Jerome H. Powell explained that since the SLRs adoption, the financial environment has changed significantly. He highlighted that instead of the expected decline in bank reserves, reserves have grown substantially, as have Treasury holdings on bank balance sheets. He stated that this buildup of "low-risk assets" has made the leverage ratio "more binding" than originally intended, raising concerns that it may now disincentivize banks from engaging in "low-risk activities, such as Treasury market intermediation." He supported revisiting the calibration of the leverage ratio to reflect these shifts, emphasizing that the proposed changes remain aligned with the Basel Committee's framework.

Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle W. Bowman argued that the eSLR has become "a binding constraint rather than a backstop," discouraging low-risk activities like Treasury intermediation. She supported replacing fixed buffers with a dynamic approach tied to each G-SIB's Method 1 surcharge to better align with Basel standards and ease pressure during stress. She emphasized that the change wouldn't boost shareholder payouts, as holding companies remain bound by risk-based requirements and support obligations. She called the proposal "an important first step" and welcomed feedback on alternatives, including excluding certain Treasuries or reserves from the SLR denominator.

Fed Governor Michael S. Barr warned that the proposal would undermine financial stability without delivering meaningful benefits to Treasury market functioning. He raised concerns that the proposal: (i) substantially lowers the amount of capital large banks are required to hold; (ii) slashes the eSLR "nearly three-fold" compared with the 2018 draft and carves an extra $65 billion from GSIBs' Tier 1 capital; (iii) is unlikely to meaningfully improve banks' role in the Treasury market, particularly during periods of financial stress; and (iv) "erodes the transparency of the capital backstop" by tying the leverage ratio to a risk-based GSIB surcharge and relying on Method 1 solely to justify deeper capital cuts. He said the proposal "puts our banking system at risk," but signaled he is open to a more modest eSLR revision if paired with full Basel III implementation.

Fed Governor Adriana D. Kugler supported revising the eSLR calculation for G-SIB holding companies to avoid discouraging low-risk activities like Treasury market intermediation. She opposed the broader proposal because it includes a 27 percent reduction in Tier 1 capital requirements for G-SIB bank subsidiaries—a change she believes could increase systemic risk. She argued that banks are not the primary intermediaries in Treasury markets, and that shifting capital away from bank subsidiaries could leave them vulnerable during financial stress. She also cautioned against making isolated changes to leverage ratios without considering pending reforms like Basel III and stress testing. She also emphasized the need for a more holistic approach to capital regulation.

Fed Governor Christopher J. Waller argued that while leverage ratios play an important role in ensuring bank safety, the current eSLR is often a binding capital requirement rather than a backstop. He stated that this miscalibration can discourage banks from holding lower-risk assets—such as Treasuries—by treating them the same as high-risk assets under the leverage ratio. He highlighted that this has broader implications for financial stability, especially in times of stress when large banks are constrained from supporting markets like the Treasury market. He said he favors reducing the degree to which the eSLR binds over excluding specific assets from its calculation and emphasized that regulators should not favor certain assets over others. He also argued that banks should manage their own risks.

Commentary

Consider the following initial takeaways:

  • Comparison to the 2018 FRB and OCC Proposal. The FRB and OCC's 2018 proposal regarding eSLR reform served, at least to some extent, as precedent for the US prudential regulators' current eSLR reform proposal. Both proposals (i) seek to better align the eSLR with risk-based capital requirements (so that risk-based capital requirements serve as the binding regulations rather than the leverage capital requirements); and (ii) tie a G-SIB's eSLR requirements to the G-SIB surcharge, thereby calibrating a G-SIB's leverage buffer with its systemic footprint as measured via the G-SIB surcharge. The 2018 proposal would have replaced each G-SIB's 2% eSLR leverage buffer with a leverage buffer set equal to half of the relevant firm's applicable surcharge as determined according to the G-SIB surcharge methodologies. In contrast, the current proposal would more specifically set the eSLR standards to half of the method 1 surcharge, resulting in greater capital relief for G-SIBs than the 2018 proposal because "method 2 surcharges are currently greater than or equal to method 1 surcharges" for all G-SIBs (see proposal at p. 96). 
  • No Exclusion for Treasury Securities...but a Request for Comment. Despite market participants clamoring for the exclusion of Treasury securities from the leverage ratios, such exclusion is not part of the proposed eSLR reform. However, the proposal does request comment on a potential modification to the calculation of total leverage exposure for depository institution holding companies to "exclude Treasury securities that are reported as trading assets on the organizations' balance sheets and that are held at broker-dealer subsidiaries (and foreign equivalents thereof) that are not subsidiaries of a depository institution" (see proposal at p. 30). The proposal states that this "narrow exclusion approach" would "provide an automatic 'safety valve' for Treasury market intermediation for cases in which balance sheets rapidly expand...[and] would enable a larger group of depository institution holding companies, including those subject to Category II or III capital standards in addition to [G-SIBs], to increase their U.S. Treasury market intermediation without affecting the required amount of tier 1 capital under the supplementary leverage ratio requirement" (see proposal at p. 30). The US prudential regulators acknowledged that one consequence of this "narrow exclusion approach" is that it may lead to a slippery slope of market participants requesting even more types of exposures to be excluded from the denominator of the supplementary leverage ratio.
  • Consistency with the International Basel Framework. Throughout the proposal, the US prudential regulators emphasize the value of international alignment on prudential standards to "limit[] the potential for a global 'race to the bottom'" (see proposal at p. 25). Market participants should consider that the US prudential regulators' apparent concern for consistency of the proposed leverage capital reforms with the international Basel framework may be a key reason why the proposal does not exclude Treasury securities from the leverage ratios (and why any finalized eSLR reform may not exclude Treasuries either).
  • Dissents of FRB Governors Barr and Kugler. While both FRB Governors Barr and Kugler dissented from the proposal, arguing that the proposal goes too far in providing capital relief and thereby increases the risk of a G-SIB failure, each of their dissenting statements signals an openness to more modest leverage capital reform that addresses the financial stability and systemic risk concerns they raise with respect to the proposal.

Email me about this

Tags